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This paper was written in the very early stages of my. research
the gold and diamond industries in South Africa* The sources
for much of the material oh which the paper is based were, in the.
obtained from the standard literature available on the subject*
u tha tr^ aatmernt accorded to^this material was my own. However,
the "Use of these secondary source* alone has meant that my investi-
gations have been confined to certain areas of the subject matter only,
while I have been forced to "ignore" other areas which I feel to be
important. As a result Z have not been able to develop some of the
arguments in the paper to the extent, that I might have wished.
A) The Background
"Gentlemen, this 4-S the rock on which the future success of
South Africa wil l be built" ^Colonial Secretary, 1867). .
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Though the diamond industry would, after a relat ively short
p r i o d of i t s l i f e , be eclipsed by the gold industry in South Africa,
the discovery of diamonds on a large scale ushered in a period pf
\yealth and prosperity which\alt€sxed the social history of the country
in a dramatic way. Apart fxtom the direct wealth^ produced by the '
industry (by 1936 over £32Oa worth of diamonds had been produced in
South Africa)! , the diamond mining industry encouraged the development
of a large-scale infrastructural network both within the country and
J / S c j u t f r Africa and Europe j 2 i For instance.,.by the time, the
4y sjjsffiiii. had reached K£mb^rleykpver/ £14m ^
Debf) fe4''been^i^ve#tf!tf ih?;£$ by ^he Coloh5.ai:j ^ " / ^ £o p
^ 9 ^ y ^ ^ that occurred within; the
i t ' w^uld be useful ^H«*|y^to'outline the state of the world
economy oves this efx^y t^ lpj.bjd;:>^  tThe eauly^industrial doijiinapce of - ..
eritaiti >(duiing jthe period friosi^-abp'ut-1780 to lB49);li^<3 ^'iveh way to
^ period of [intense i n t e r ^ t ^ o ^ ^ ; ; p o « ^ t i t ^
^ore recently Jin4ustrialised;:po>^je-sf (euch As frahce, C^r^ny^ ah<$: the
USA), in which Britain with a mprjB obsolete technology and an inabi l i ty
to adapt to new technical-demands^'became-increasingly the losejp..3
Unable to sustain her high level of exports to tji^se new industrial
Centres (as.a result of their "Protectionist* pol ic ies ) and because
pe.e^ .^ffir urinary, products
 9 .Britain began increasingly ov^r this(1040 •* 1880) to turn her attentions to -the;' as yet"laargely,
^ ' 6f the w6fcW;4 ftt th^ same time,' there was a dramatic
increase in the ,^nternationacl Jfl'^ ws &f "capital," tr&de and labour .5
By the 1870?e interests^andL.iiiyjrlondi, fin^capdttal invested abroad were
Britain's most important.spurce* of foreign exchange ( this trend
reflected' the rls^ of :tnfe Ci^ ty' "bf^ Xoriaon 'is^the nevv "financial centre
of the world) and tHelr'ikportance was growing, fcn particularV i t
was the Jwhite1 dominions of Canada, Australia,^ New Zealand and' South
Africa 1wt*icirirec'eived the greatest sh^xo '6f this' inve&tftent -'from-
1:2SS'fn t^Tttf l'86d(s' to'aamps-t'aOlf in the V880«s. (After the First
World1 War the share of the bo'rainJJon s became even more imppftaiit -
taking - aJx»oflt 4O9S or Britain'* total foreign investment.)0 Of the total
British foreign investment by public issue in 1914 (£3,765t3m), South
Africa alone received £370.2m (9.895). Only the USA (£754.6m), Canada
(£514.9m)( Australia and New Zealand (£416.4m) and India and Ceylon
(378.8m) received larger shares.7
It is sufficient then to note at this stage that the beginning
of diamond production in South Africa coincided with a period in which
the accumulated wealth of Europe was growing at a rate incomparably
faster than ever before, and that in particular this was a period in
which Britain was emerging as the world's financier. Furthermore, it
is clear that South Africa was at this time the recipient of a sub- \.
stantial share of British capital fo.r foreign investment. The. more
specific question of the extent iS'which the diamond industry in South
Africa was itself the recipient of foreign capital is much more
difficult to answer. This paper, which seeks to trace the evolution
of South Africa's diamond industry, will not attempt to provide &
definitive answer to this question.
B) The Early Years: From Digger's Democracy to Joint Stock Companies
(1867 - 1882T ' - :
The very earliest period of diamond mining in South Africa was
most obviously characterised by disorganisation. Since the 1850's
when gold was first discovered In the Transvaal (and later when, in |
1866 it was discovered in Mashonaland and, in 1868, in the Tati area)
th&re had been a drift of exploring parties and 'diggers' from Britain,
Canada and Australia to the interior of South Africa* However, the
discovery of the first diamond at Hopetown in 1866 stimulated a search
for diamonds as well as gold. By 1869 over 20 diamonds had been
discovered near the Vaal, the Orange and the Riet Rivers and interest
was growing. More systematic exploration was begun which led to the
opening of the "river diggings" near Klipdrift (later Barkly West)
on the Vaal and then the "dry diggings" on the farm Bultfontein, which
were to prove of more lasting importance. By the end of lB^ there were
5 mines in operation (in order of date of discovery): Bultfontein,
Dutoitspan, the 'Old Rush', the 'New Rush1 and Jagersfontein. All of
these mines, except for the last, were geographically close together
(in the Kimberley area).
This early period of a somewhat disorganised 'scramble1 - the
period of the so-called "digger's democracy" - can, however, be
disentangled to an extent by examining the twin processes of the
production and sale of diamonds. In the early years of the diamond
industry in South Africa the producers tended to be a rather raotby 4
collection of 'fortune hunters', among whom v«ere such names as Rudd, ~
Jameson, Maguire and Rhodes himself; these men came to be known initially
as the 'successful diggers' and the sou.rce of their wealth was in
production itself. The dealers, on the other hand, tended to be
financiers who were either based in Kimberley and who often had links
with the international narket in London (this group included men
such as Beit, Wernher, Barnato, Albu, Echstein, Newmann, Robinson and
the Mosenthals) or they were based in London and Europe and tended to
be large-scale international diamond dealers with links in South
Africa (e.g. the French firm of Jules Porges & Co.), This division
is, however, in a sense too crude In that some diggers became dealers
as well (e.g. Rhodes and Harris), while some dealers bought claims
(e.g. Barnato and Robinson)A In addition, some of the larger
European dealers, like Jules Poxges, moved in to deal in South African
diamonds and to buy up claims, while certain of the KimberIcy-based
dealers moved into the London market (e.g. the Barnatos and
Dunkelsbukler).
However, broadly speaking, :ve can at this stage discern certain
divisions within the diamond industry which ,vill prove critical to
its later development: first, there are those whose main economic
activity is production, i.e. digging itself; then there are those
dealers based predominantly in Kimberley, but operating in other
South African centres as well; and, finally (as a subdivision of the
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dealers group) there were the large international dealers who showed
increasing interest in the South African diamond finds. These three
'separate1 groups all had their own 'distinct' (though interrelated)
problems. The diggers, who were small, independent producers, had, on
the vvhola, not much capital and for them the basic economic need was
to produce as many diamonds as they possibly could to sell to the
dealers. For the dealers, however, increased production, for what »»as
at that time essentially a luxury commodity, meant the possibility of
a sudden drastic fall in prices which could lead to their being caught
with large quantities of unsaleable stones. Although this problem was
feared most by the small dealers (mainly established in South Africa)
who lacked the capital resources to sustain a prolonged fall in prices,
there was a good deal of panic among the large international dealers,
who feared that South African production would not only flood the
mar-cet, but that it would cause it to collapse,6 Disorganisation in
the industry prevented any solution emerging until, with the advent of
an international financial and commercial crisis in 1873, the inevit-
able occurred - prices fell sharply, squeezing not only the dealers
but ultimately, of course, the producers as well.
Although this crisis did not last it did point to the two crucial
weaknesses of the diamond industry which would require decades to 'solve1
successfully. These were: excessive production in relation to current
demand and disorganised market conditions. As long as the diamond
industry in South Africa was based on production by a large number of
separate competitive units'- that is, essentially weak producers .with
no. staying power who;sold at any'price - and as long as sales were
carried out through large numbers of separate channels (most of whom
were unable to hold stocks when conditions were unfavourable) not only
South Africa's position, but the stability of the international
diamond market was threatened. However, factors were already at .vork,
both in the realm of the producers and in the realm of the dealers,
which were to lead towards.a gradual 'solution* to these problems.
Regarding the producers, although it had at first been thought
that the dry diggings would soon be exhausted, the discovery of
diamond pipes (which meant that diamonds were to be found not only near
the surface, but at great depths as well) indicated that the diamond
mining industry was to have a relatively long-term future in South
Africa. But it also meant that the established method of production
had now become outmoded. The transition to deep-^evel mining brought
with it ne-v technical problems for the digger. Falling reef and
flooding became problems that the digger, with his relatively crude
method of production and his inability (due to a lack of capital re-
sources) to purchase and transport the necessary plant that was
required to deal with these problems, *as unable to cope with. The
only solution was to abandon open quarrying and to undertake sub-
terranean mining on a large scale. This transition implied the, death
of the form of organisation known as •digger's democracy' - of the
small-scale unit - as the basis of diamond production in South Africa
and the birth of the large-scale unit, the Joint-Stocu Company as the
new basis. An example of this new process of lateral integration was
the combination of the highly successful claims of Rudd, Rhodes,
Maguire and others, who bought up smaller claims on the 'Old Rush'
dry digging, and, subsequently, in 1880, formed the De Beers Diamond
Mining Company with a capital of £200,000.9
At the same time as the technical demands of diamond production
were leading to the formation of joint-stock companies, the dealers
were being severely rocked by the impact of the 1873 crisis, which,
apart from knocking out the smaller, less secure dealers, clearly
increased the pressure on all dealers to 'rationalise' the mechanisms
of marketing diamonds. Increased demands were made on the Cape
Government to enact legislation towards this end, such as for example,
the demands made on the Government: to curb Illicit Diamond Buying
(IDB);in 1874 legislation was passed which legally confined the
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diamond trade to licensed dealers (who paid an annual fee of £50) and
brokers (who paid £25). Gradually, then, as a result of these and
other measures, a properly articulated diamond market began to develop,
at the same time as numbers of small dealers began to *pool* their
resources and the partnership form of organisation evolved in the
interests of dealers security. Hence, the process of lateral integration
began to develop more or less simultaneously among both producing and
dealing concerns.
However, despite the evolution of this process during the 12 years
1870 - 1862, the number of separate mining and dealing groups that
operated at this time was quite large. In fact, among the producers,
the early days and first successes of the Joint-Stocic Company produced
a sudden proliferation of companies.10 At the beginning of 1880, 12
companies existed with interests in the five large mines and with a
total capital of some £2$m, the shares having been issued mainly to
vendors and promoters, who, as the major holders, exercised effective
control. Of these there were 3 companies - De Beers, Kimberley Central
and the French Company11 - which .rere to become increasingly important
in the coming years. In the first 6 months of 1881, 59 new companies
were floated which meant that the total share capital of the 71 companies
now stood at £8m, the shares being subscribed for largely in the
colony.12 The banks actively assisted in fanning this speculative
boom by making advances against scrip. However, the inevitable
depression which followed with the sudden fall in share values13 was
to usher in a new era in the evolution of the industry - the era of
amalgamation*
C) The Era of Amalgamation: 1883 * 1890
By 1885, as a result of the impact of the Depression the number
of diamond companies in existence had been reduced from 71 to 42 and
holdings were slowly being consolidated. However, the transition to
deep-level mining and the comparative disorganisation of the market
meant that the twin problems of the diamond industry .vere reasserting
themselves again - but with increasing force. Costs were rising as
miners began operating at even greater depths at the same time as
prices were falling as a result of over-production. It was clear that
the control of supply was essential if the diamond industry was to
remain economically viable*
Over this period the De Beers Company 'progressed with extra-
ordinary success, expanding its range of ownership, absorbing step by '
step its floundering neighbours1.115 By March 1885, the capital of
De Beers had reached £841,550 - from .£200,000 in 1880. Similar
successes had accompanied the development of the Kimberley Central Co.,
so that these two companies had emerged as the richest in the diamond
world. However, the competitive nature of diamond production.at this
time (caught between rising costs and falling prices) made voluntary
agreement among the mine-owners themselves to restrict output, an
impossible task and a number of attempts failed to achieve any agree-
ment. But the increased pressures on the industry were such that what
could not be achieved by voluntary agreement would have to be achieved
by economic force. The wealth of De Beers and the links which Rhodes
had with European capital as well as with other powerful diamond
companies gave him a unique opportunity to exploit the situation to
the advantage of De aeers.
Up until this time it would seem that relatively little foreign
capital was used in the development of the diamond industry in South
Africa* As Frankel points out:
"It is certain that only small amounts of capital were applied
to the alluvial dealings. This is also true of the dry diggings
"16
.. •
The establishment of the Joint-Stock companies 6eems to have been
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accomplished by using capital in large part raised from the profits
of successful claim-holders and dealers; the remainder coming from
those shares that were subscribed for in the colony. Banks, as we
noted earlier, played an important part in this.l7Although the form-
ation of Joint-Stock Companies in the diamond industry greatly enhanced
their chances of profitable business and their chances of increasing
their influence in the industry, banks do not seem to have participated
to any major extent in providing the large capital outlays that *ere
necessary to make amalgamation a reality. For this Rhodes, as the
advocate of amalgamation, had to turn to the vast capital market of
Europe.
Rhodes'a dealing and speculative activities in London had brought
him (largely through the South African Chartered Co.) into contact with
a group of powerful international financiers, including such important
names as the Rothschilds. As a result of these connections he had come
into close contact with two strong supporters of the concept of
amalgamation in the diamond industry as a way of bringing about the
necessary control in the industry - they were Beit and Wernher of the
company Jules Porges and Co., which controlled the French Company, one
of the Big Three in Kimberley. /5ee Note 1}/ Beit also had close links
with Lippert and Company of Hamburg. These two men, .vho would shortly
set up their own firm of Wernher Beit and Co* as the successor to Jules
Porges and Co, agreed to throw in their claims with Rhodes and support
him in his aims for amalgamation.
In 1887 Rhodes gained complete control of the De Beers Mine for
the De Beers Company. He then moved to gain control of the remaining
companies. By this time (1888) the capital of De Beers had risen to
£2,509,620. At the same time the Kimberley Central Co., controlled by
Barnato, had, by a steady process of amalgamation, extended its claim
area by absorbing the other companies In the Kimberley Mine (these
included the extremely rich French Company), so that in 1888 it had an
issued share capital of £1,748,190 and owned the entire Kimberley Mine.18
Thus two of the leading figures in mining - Barnato and Rhodes (the
latter supported by Wernher, Beit and Rothschild) - faced each other
for the final confrontation.
But the cards had already been stacked in Rhodes*s favour. In
1880 the Rothschilds in conjunction with Lippert had, through a
syndicate, bought out the majority shareholders in the French Company.
Thus the takeover of the French Company by the Kimberley Company, which
invoVed the amalgamation of properties, was carried out with Rhodes*s
approval. He then bought out the syndicates that had controlled the
French Company and, with this coup, set. himself up to take over the
Kimberley Central Co. in the largest amalgamation in South Africa*s
history1? - De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. was established.
That left Dutoitspan and Bultfontein Mines in the Kimberley area.
In quick succession Rhodes bought up most of the companies in those
mines (valued at £4*500,000).20_' At the time of consolidation, the total
market valuation of all the properties involved in amalgamation was
£23,434,250.21
Thus the immense wealth which, as a result of the process of
amalgamation, came to be concentrated tinder the standard of De Beers
Consolidated Mines heralded the rise of a small group of financiers to
a position of dominance both within the diamond industry itself and
also within the overall context of the South African economy. These
men - Rhodes, Rudd, Wernher, Beit, Barnato and their associates - whose
financial wealth had arisen from different sources within the industry
now combined their resources to form themselves into a financial
oligarchy that, exercised control over the largest profit-making
concern in the country. With the huge financial resources of De Beers
at their disposal and backed by powerful European financiers like the
Rothschilds and Lippert (without whom the dominance of De Beers would
not have been achieved at that time) they *ere perfectly poised not
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only to direct the future economic growth of the country, but, as the
dominant force within the ruling class in South Africa, to direct the
political future of the country as well.
D) Centralization of Control; The Beginnings of Vortical Integration
(1890 - 1902)
The lateral integration of diamond production described above had
its origins, primarily, in the fact that the most economical working of
the diamond mines involved expensive plant which in its turn favoured
the organisation of production by large capitalists. Competition among
the different large capitalist groups (intensified by rising costs and
falling prices) led to the need to control production, which initiated
the period of amalgamation culminating in the emergence of De Beers
Consolidated Mines as the most powerful company in the industry con-
trolled by a tiny group of international financiers. But control of
production - that is, lateral integration among the producing agents -
was not sufficient to prevent a possible collapse of the market.
Although amalgamation would enable De Beers to regulate output to an
extent so as to prevent over-production, this could not solve the
problem of how to deal with fluctuations in the value of diamonds on
the world market. What was needed then, firstly, was a marketing
organisation that could "feel the pulse of the demand" and which was \
financially strong enough to hold back diamonds when the values were
low. Secondly, for De Beers to be able to regulate their output
successfully they needed to be sure of a continuity of sales in the
long run in order to finance production over a long period. In other
words, what was required, in the first place, was the lateral integration
of the marketing sphere of the diamond industry (such as had occurred
among the producers), and, secondly, the vertical integration of the
whole industry.*2 :
This was no easy matter to accomplish for, although the small
group of De Beers financiers had come to dominate the industry, their
power at this stage was far from complete. Not only would they face
considerable opposition from their competitors as they struggled,
through further integration of the industry, to extend their influence
and consolidate their power, but they themselves formed as yet a
relatively loose alliance plagued by cross-currents of self-interest
that threatened to undermine their coexistence. The fact that the
interests of this financial group reflected, to an extent, the
fundamental division of the industry itself - i.e. production and
dealing - meant that an attempt to fuse these t:vo 'aspects' of the
industry could easily bring to the surface those latent contradictions
within the group which could shatter its newly-established cohesion.
The 1873 'crisis' had, as we mentioned earlier, initiated the
process of lateral integration among dealers. Dealers such as Wernher
and Beit, in particular, who had long favoured the idea of the con-
centration of control in the diamond industry, who had assisted Rhodes
in his successful amalgamation bid, again assisted him to organise
a group of diamond merchants in Kimberley who would buy up the complete
output of the mines which were now controlled by the De Beers company.
This was the beginning of vertical integration in the industry.^3 In
September 1889 this inforual channel for sales became formalised by an
agreement between De Beers, on the one hand, and the small but
powerful "group of merchants on the other (consisting of Wernher, Beit
the Mo sent ha IS and Barnato)', who came to be known as the Diamond
^yndieatc;* However/1:he agreement between the producers and distri-
butors took time to become established as a permanent feature of the
industry* Apart from the central fact that there was in one sense a
conflict of interests between these two groups - the Syndicate
favoured a larger; reduction of output by De Beers to prevent a fall
in. the; value ox* diamonds, whereas the Beers favoured a smaller
\educCion of output pressing for the Syndicate to hold larger stocks .
• fin other"-words, each side wished to increase its owiv profits and push
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the greatest share of the risk onto the oth^r side) - there was also*
the problem that lateral integration on the distribution side had b<%on
far Ir.ss complete than among the producers and, hence, those dealers
excluded from the Syndicate group (and whoso livelihood suffered as a
rosult) were a powerful and potentially dangerous force. The first
agreement laaued only thre'* months. A second agreement was formulated
in February 1800, In order to overcome the second problem, this
Syndicate included n larger number of firms - ten, to be precise, each
with a specific quota.* This contract remained in operation until
1902, when a. new contract involving 8 firms was signed. The 1902
contract is important because for the first time the principle was
established that the profits from sales would be divided up between
De Beers and the Syndicate. Prior to this agreement, the "rrcmgem-jnt
had been based on th 2 previous system which operated between producers
end distributors, which was that the Syndicate bought up the diamonds
at an agreed price and then got what they could for them. The new agree-
ment signified the extent to which the De Beers group of financiers, who
had been the driving force behind the setting up of the Syndicate, had
now come to assert their power over the sellers organisation.2^ The
beginning of vertical integration in the diamond Industry thus further
extended the area of their control over the industry as a whole.
As a result of their monopoly on the production side the financiers
wera able to regulate the output of the mines so as to avoid over-
production and realise high prices for the sale of diamonds; as a result
of the vast financial resources of the Diamond Syndicate, the stock
could be held when prices fell so that the supply never exceeded the
demand. In addition, it was now possible for De Beers in conjunction
with the Syndicate to manipulate price rises by withholding stock. De
Beers Consolidated thus emerged from this period in control of by far
the most important mines which contributed to the world's supply of
diamonds, fortified by the reorganisation of the marketing process,
which it had brought about* The supremacy of De Beers and the men who
controlled it seemed absolute, yet the events which were to occur over
the next few years would severely test the structure which had been set
up and on which they relied to maintain their position of dominance.
E) The Challenge to De Beers; 1902 - 1914
At the time of the amalgamation and the establishment of De Beers
Consolidated, a principle had been Inaugurated which vas to govern the
operations of the company throughout the next half-century. This
principle was that the company must acquire not only actually producing
mines - this included both highly successful and relatively unsuccessful
mines which had to be bought up for their 'nuisance' valued - but also
areas that might contain diamonds. Hence, De Beers bought up large
numbers of farms in the Klmberley area*
But the activities of De Beers did not at all remain confined to
the Kimberley area. It had acquired Interests in the Jagersfontein and ,
Koffigfontein mines, thus spreading its interests into the Orange Free
State and. by other acquisitions, into the Transvaal as well* In 1899
De Beers bought out one of the largest ground landlords in the country
at that time, the London and South African Exploration Company. As a
result of his •international* connections Rhodes was able to secure a
deal with the British SouthnAfrica Company which gave De Beers "a
proferent right to any diamonds that may be found ... as a sort of
commission wherever the chartered territories extend".2 In addition,
De Beers secured a pre-emptive right to diamonds In the territories'
controlled by the South West Africa Company.26 By 1998 Rhodes could
say to De Beers shareholders with confidence:
"You may be quite sure whenever you hear that a new mine has been
discovered, that if De Bears are not there they are very near the
spot and ... we always get the first information*"2^
However, though Rhodes and his associates made every effort to
protect their monopoly position by buying up as many properties, as they
could which were suspected of containing diamonds and by buying
substantial holdings In or taking ovrcr producing mines, events were
to prove their efforts inadequate with the result that the dominance of
De Beers and the newly-established stability of the world diamond
market were both to take a severe shaking very soon* In 1902, following
diamond discoveries by Culllnan near Pretoria, the Premier (Transvaal)
Diamond Mining Company was formed.
Although Do Beers by this time had come to dominate the diamond
Indus try, ha ving effective control both over production and (through
th<2 Syndicate) distribution, nonetheless it is true that De Beera's
control was far from complete. Outside of its control were the small
alluvial mines - the Rivar Diggings * and a number of other minor mines.
In addition, of course, was the fear - often enough expressed by Rhodes
and his colleagues - that a new source of supply would be discovered
wh lch it was beyond the power (both financial and otherwise) of De Beers
to acqulr e. Such a discovery threatened not only to reduce the value
of diamonds significantly and, hence, reduce the profits of D; Beers,
but it also threatened to destroy the unity of the De Beers croup of
financiers by tearing the newly-established single producing/marketing
structure apart* (The discovery of any new and potentially rich mine was
bound to reduce the willingness of the Syndicate to carry stocks since
they would fear the sudden fall of demand behind supply* ;
In fact, the discovery of the Premier Mine proved even worse than
Rhodes had feared* Not only was the Mine particularly rich, but in
addition the owners of the Mine refused either to sell out to De Beers
or even to sell through the Syndicate, preferring to set up their own
selling organisation in London* The Premier Mine had been started as
a * Joint Enterprise1 ^  with the Government (from 1903) holding 60% of
the shares in the Mine and the Premier Company holding the remainder*
Costs In the mine were much higher than for De Beers (stones were
predominantly small and output per load was touch less than at Kiraberley)
and, hence, a very large output was required to compensate the minority
Interest for the total costs involved* From its earliest days Premier
embarked upon a vigorous production programme, output rising from
750,000 carats in 1904 to 1,890,000 carats In 1907* (The aggregate De
Beers output during this period fluctuated around 2,056,000 carats In
1904 and 2,062,000 in 1907*)30 The one thing which Da Beers had feared
mors than anything else - a sudden Increase of stones on the market -
had happened, though the fact that the prices for diamonds (and in
particular for De Beers stones) Were rising at this time coupled with
the fact that, through the Syndicate, De Beers was able to ensure that,
by holding back on production, the aggregate output could be kept within
the absorptive capacity of the market, meant that no serious damage was
done to the market at the moment* In addition, Beit who had always
favoured establishing an agreement with Premier had ensured that a
thoroughly effective liaison was maintained between the two groups in
the merchandizing of the diamonds, so as to try and prevent the market
from being swamped*31
However, in 1907 disaster struck the industry in the form of a
recession* Hie country most heavily affected by the recession was ths
USA, and the collapse of the diamond market thare hit the diamond ind-
u stry very badly,3?- seriously shaking the relations between producers
and distributors, which had already suffered as a result of the
inability of De Beers to break the •independent1 stand of Premier*
In 1908 the Syndicate declared their Inability to continue buying fixed'
quantities of diamonds until the market altered.-" DG Beers agreed to
accept a very substantial drop in output, but Premie refused to co-
operate, continuing to sell through their ovn channel*34 As a result
of these contradictory policies the percentages of the combined output
of the two groups altered dramatically (Premier's percentage rose from
26.7% in 1904 to 55*61 in 1908) - and the average value of diamonds
dropped immediately (from 23/1 per carat in 1907 to 14/9 in 1900 and
12/6 In 1909»)35 The De Beers group's carefully laid plans to prevent
the flooding of the market had proved Inoperative under the combined
pressures of Premier's increased production and a collapse of the world
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market. In addition, the collapse of the diamond market which
threatened to destroy the source of their wealth could, unless it
checked, dislodge ths DG Beers financiers from thair dominant position
within the economic and political lifa of the country.
However, in the middle of 1909 thn recession lifted, and
market relations were resumed, thus averting the likely collapse of
either one of the two competing groups. Cut the damage to both groups
had been quite severe. Premier had had to recsiva Skja worth of
assistance from the Transvaal Government, while, in the De Beers group,
the Dutoitspan Mine had boon closed down and all thn participating
companies in DG Beers end the Syndicate had lost money. It was clear
that neither the policy of the Freraier group to remain independently
organised for production nor the policy of be Beers to try and 'sit it
out* while Premier destroyed themselves had proved successful for either
party. In addition, both groups faced th2 threat of a vast new source
of diamonds having been discover^ in South West Africa. It was fait
by both groups that for the continued survival of all concerned what
was needed was a reorganisation of the existing structure so as to
Impose a firmer form of centralised control.
Diamonds had been discovered in German South West Africa in April
1903. De Beers, however, despite the fact that they had received
reports of "very rich alluvial finds", tended at first to underrato
the importance of alluvial discoveries as such and, htsncv'j, regarded the
reports as over-estimates. By the time it became clear that South West
African production was to become a permanent feature of the diamond
industry,36 a considerable amount of Independent organisation had
occurred. Lateral integration among both producers and distributors
occurred very quickly. Among the producers the German Colonial
Government and two powerful syndicates emerged as the major forcos,
while on the distribution side the sals abroad of diamonds was entrusted
from early on to a single company, the Diamond Regie of South Wast
Africa, which was incorporated in Berlin in February 1909.
De Beers had no choice but to work within this structure, firstly,
because of the value of the discoveries ar*d, secondly, because of the
huge financial power of the groups involved (those syndicates were
backed by large banks like the Berliner Grundergescllschaft). De Beers
acquired some chores in the German Colonial Company, while the
Syndicate negotiated with the Regia. In addition, in 1909 De Beers and
the Syndicate "Jointly participated11 in ths buying of South West African
diamonds. The Regie which had originally sold to an Antwerp syndicate,
switched in 1912 to the London market where they competed with the
(De Beers) Syndicate. As in the case of Premier, an agreement was
organised between the two organisations for marketing purposes, whereby
the German Government agreed to enforce a partial limitation of output.
The position at this stage then was that De Beers had been ousted
from its previous position of supremacy. Although it still wielded
considerable power, it no longer had a monopoly of world diamond
production and was unable at this stage to break the •independent*
position of its competitors. In 1914 the Union Government supported
by De Beers proposed a conference "between the South African diamond
producers" to determine "whether joint action shou Id not be token
fey the producers to safeguard their mutual interests".37 The German
Colonial Office and the Regie would be Invited as well* On 30 July
1914 - five days before the outbreak of War30 - the South African
producers and the Diamond Regie concluded an agreement. This agreement
established a diamond pool of producers (with a board of control
representative of the producers) who sold their output to the Syndicate,
which was rewarded on a commission basis and empowered to buy up to
filOm worth of 'outside1 diamonds* Be Beer6* quota was to be 48%,
Premier's 31%, ths Regie^s 21%.
Although the War ended this attempt at International control of
the diamond market, the future trend of events was clear. De Beers*s
position had been shaken by the difficult years of 1902 to 1914, but
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the company had emerged as still the most powerful force within an
Industry that had Increasingly demanded - and would continue to demand -
a more centralised form of control*
P) De Beers 'Other* Investments: Beyond Diamonds
However, we have spoken so far only of De Beers's interests in the
diamond mining industry. For a fuller understanding of the power which
the company wielded within South Africa, (as well as for a better under-
standing of the events which were to follow the Great War within the
diamond industry itself) it is necessary to comment on De Beers'e
investments •outside' the field of diamonds and of the reasons for them.
In his book on the 'Evolution of Modern Capitalism1 J. A. Hpbson
wrote:39
*'A trust or other combine cannot find room to invest its profits
within the 'trusted' industry! It must go outside. These profits
pass into general finance, and are thence directed into forming
and financing other trusts and large businesses. Thus ^he process
of concentration and consolidation proceeds apace over all those
Industrial fields where capitalist methods of production prevail«"
Hobson's argument is based on the assumption that, since
"the profitable management of a trust depends primarily upon
regulation of output, which involves a limitation on the
employment of capital ••• it is thus impossible for a trust-
maker to find full continuous employment for the high profits
he makes by extending the plant and working capital of Jiis own
business - such a policy would be suicidal. He must look
outside his own business for fields of profitable investments
for his profits *.* Thus the profits arising from specific
monopolies are logically forced into the more general regiQns
of finance* They form a large and a growing fund of free
capital which naturally associates itself with the free funds
held by bankers ••."
Nowhere do these arguments appear more convincing than when they
are applied to the case of capital accumulation in the diamond industry
of South Africa, the viability of which depended upon the stfict
regulation of output, while, at the same time, the profits of the
industry were enormous. The question of the disposal of these profits
had to be carefully handled* It was the huge profits accumulated by
Rhodes and others that enabled them to establish the De Beers Company
in the first place, a company whose vast capital resources enabled it to
buy up all the known existing and potential diamond areas in the country
By the turn of the century the Company owned 538,000 acres of la,nd
regarded as (potentially or actually) dlamondlferous.
However, it was part of the established policy of Rhodes for
De Beers to apply the principle of investment outside the strict con-
fines of the diamond industry. For this reason Rhodes had frajned the
trust deed of the Company to give it very wide powers which would make
this possible* Hence, in accordance with Hobson's analysis, we find
De Beers investing in shares in the British South Africa Co* and its
associated railway-building activities; in cattle raising, horse
breeding and fruit and wine farming, (which led to the formation of the
Rhodes Fruit Farms Ltd*); in explosives; in banking and other financial
institutions; in coal-mining, copper-mining and, of course, gold-mining*
While serving as an outlet for 'surplus1 profits - that is, as a means
of completely utilising resources acquired through the diamond business
these investments also served as a 'hedge' against the risks associated
with the diamond industry* Of course this is not to argue that the
surplus was being 'dumped* in the sense of being indiscriminately
disposed of - the choices for investment were very carefully selected
to best serve the interests of De Beers* For instance, the investments
in collieries were aimed at overcoming the problems of the high cost
and availability of fuel at the timej the investments in railways and
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telegraphs aimed at building up means of communication and hence
increasing efficiency; the farming ventures aimed at utilizing the
resources De Beers had acquired as a result of becoming a great
landlord; the explosives investment aimed at circumventing the costs
of explosives which arose from the 'dynamite monopoly'; while
investments in other mining ventures was a 'natural' course for a
mining company to follow,
This thorough penetration of the economy of the Cape Colony,
coming at a time when almost every industry in the Cape was dependent
in some form or other on De Beers, gave the company even greater
economic and political power, (Prior to 1900 De Beers alone was pro-
ducing half the exports of the Cape Colony - a quarter of the total
exports came from diamonds,) In addition to the above-mentioned
investmentst Rhodes had early on acquired a leading interest in the
press in South Africa. Together with Bckstein and Barnato, he con-
trolled the Cape Argus in Cape Town. This company (the Argus Co.)
quickly expanded to own also the Johannesburg Star, the Bulawayo
Chronicle, the Rhodesia Herald and the Africa Review. The Cape Times,
which bought up the Diamond Fields Advertiser of Kimberley, was con-
trolled by the Chartered Co. In this nay De Beers established a
structure which could give expression to its economic and political
needs (and those of its allies). Nor did Rhodes shirk from using
political power to gain these needs where necessaryi fox instance, in
the c&ses of land •concessions1 la Klabexley, the Rand and Rhodesia{
to secure special legislation and taxation concessions in the diamond
industry; to promote railway and other facilities. Rhodes himself was
directly active in politics (as was Jameson), becoming Prime Minister
of the Cape Colony. The international 'connections' of this small
group of financiers enabled them at times to secure the assistance of
the British Government to help them gain their ends (e.g. the annex-
ation of the Kimberley Diamond Fields, the seizure of Bechu&naland and,
ultimately of course the war to 'acquire' the Transvaal and Orange
Free State),
An idea of the degree of penetration and control of the South
African economy exercised by this tiny group of financiers (a mere
fraction of the local bourgeoisie) can be gauged from the following list
of directorships held in 1905 by leading figures in the diamond world*
Seven members of the De Beers Consolidated Co. between them held 6O
directorships throughout South Africa (Robinson 17, Joel 13, Maguire 10);
six members of the wernher Beit Group (closely linked with De Beers)
between them held 81 directorships (Rube 40, Neumann 17, Phillips 10),
Eighteen men from these two groups40 between them held 172 directorships
in five branches of industry (diamonds! 12; golds 119; lands 11; banke
and finances 14; railways! 5 ) . In addition, there were other individuals,
closely associated with the above combined group, who themselves had
significant interests* For example, the Albus between them held, inter
alia, 24 directorships in gold, while the Farrars held 19 in gold, Sin
land, 2 in banks and 2 in coal.
This then was the nucleus of financial power operating through the
combined resources and influence of the De Beers Group and the Wernher
Beit Group* This small international oligarchy of mine-owners and
speculators, who had been associated with the rise of De Beers, now
exercised, as a result of the wealth that had accrued to them through
its varied activities, a degree of financial power which was to extend
into the remotest regions of the economy* Amalgamation and central-
isation of control within the industry had led to the concentration of the
wealth of De Beers into their hands and they used that wealth, in
particular, to secure for themselves the fprime pickings1 in the gold
mining industry of the Rand.41
Although Kimberley was not the sole source of finance for the Rand,
the enormous wealth of the Kimberley financiers, coupled with their
international connections with the great finance houses of Europe and
their experience of large-scale organisation and the technology of
mirj-iig, :&aa3 them leaders axiong tfc& naw financial class in the
Transvaal. Of the nine leading gold mining companies in the country
in 1899 the most important was Wernher Beit and Co. It consisted of 29
mines and had a nominal capital of £18,384,567. (Market value at 1 August
1899 was £76mJ42 Within the gold industry Wernher Beit and Co. was the
leading member of a larger combination that included for all practical
purposes 4 other mining companies i the Consolidated Goldfields (owned by
Bait, Rudd and Rhodes with 19 nines and a nominal capital of £18,120,000),
S. Newmann and Co. (capital of £8,806,500), G. P&rrar and Co., and Abe
Bailey and Co*43 Virtually under the same ultimate control were two other
important groups of mines, which were largely repositories of German
capita.lt these were Goats and Co. and Albu and Co.44
Thu& cf the 9 leading mining companies only two, J. B. Robinson -
(with 19 nines and a nominal capital of £14,317,500) and Barnato'e company,
which was much smaller, remained outside the sphere of direct Influence of
the De Beers/Wernher Beit Group of financiers., The formation of the Chamber
of Mines in 1899 under the leadership of Bcksteln (who was Managing
Director of Wernher Beit and Co.) consolidated this structure and fortified
the position of the controlling group. In this way the Influence of the
owners of De Beers retched the gold mines of the Transvaal and from there
extended Into the industrial, financial, commercial and agricultural
sectors of the Transvaal economy.
With De Beers dominating the economic and political life of the Cape
Colony and the Chamber of Mines under the leadership of *femher Beit and
Co, coming increasingly to control the economic and political life of the
Transvaal, the tiny oligarchy of international financiers who controlled
the two allied groups had managed to concentrate the major economic resour-
ces of the country in their hands. They wielded ft mass of credit which
could be directed to almost any point In the economy which they required.
Yet the structural solidarity of these financial Interests was incomplete.
What existed was a lootely-conneeted structure held together and mani-
pulated by certain interlocking directorships, which could conceivably come
apart under sustained pressure. What was needed In order to bring about
the complete fusion of interests of the different groups Involved WAS some
method of securing firm control over the Industrial machinery through
which the financiers operated. What was needed was the establishment of a
solid structure that would weld the different groups together into a firm
cohesive unit which could ensure the * rational* exploitation of the
country's economic resources.
On 25 September 1917 the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa
was Incorporated.
G) The New Structure! The Fusion of Gold and Diamonds
Just as in the 19th century a small group of financiers had used .
De Beers to consolidate and extend their control over the diamond mining \
Industry, so now In the 2Oth century the Anglo-American Corporation was to
be used as the means whereby amalgamation would be carried out within the
goldVmining industry. However, In addition, Anglo-American was to be the
means whereby the financial oligarchy were able to weld the loosely linked
worlds of diamonds and gold into a closely-knit unified structure allowing
for their complete control over both these sectors of the economy, and
providing a secure and powerful base from which they could extend their
Interests to penetrate tfee rest of the economy. The process, as it occ-
urred, will be briefly outlined below.
The Anglo-American Corporation was established by Ernest
Oppenhelmer in 1917 With the support of a fraction of financiers within
the dominant oligarchy In London* This fraction was headed by Anton
Dunkelabuhler, who had long been involved In the selling of diamonds
/lee notes 11 and 2V *&* whose company, A. Dunkelsbuhler and Co., had
Since 1890 been a member of the Diamond Syndicate. Through the operations
of the Consolidated Mines Selection Company and the Rand Selection
Corporation, Dunkelsbuhler had acquired important interests in gold
mining on the Par East Rand, making him a much more powerful force to be
reckoned with. The oponiny up of these new fields (Largely under Duukeis-
buhler's control) outside of the Witwatersrand fields dominated by the
Wernher Beit group enhanced the power of the Dunkelsbuhler group among the
different fractions that went to make up the dominant oligarchy.
(Dunkelsbuhler had gained control of Consolidated Mines through a merger
- 13 -
carried out in 1905; by 1916 Consolidated Mines was the largest share-
holder in Rand Selection /previously the Transvaal Coal Trust7and the
group as a whole was a rising force in the gold industry.)
Ernest Oppenheimer had first joined the firm of Dunkelsbuhler (his
cousin) in 1896. Since that date his relations with the group of
Dunkelsbuhler, Consolidated Mines and Rand Selection were extremely close*
(His brother, Louis, was a director of Dunkelsbuhler and Co., while he him-
self held directorships on the other two companies.) With the blessing of
these three companies Oppenheimer went ahead with schemes to gain the
additional support of American capital for his new company.45 When the
company was finally formed with an issued share capital of £lm (and the
power of the directors to increase this to £2m), the Board of Directors
reflected well the coalition of interests that had given rise to its birth,
Oppenheimer himself as Managing Director and Chairman and F* Lynch pro-
vided the connection with the Dunkelsbuhler group in London* The interests
of American capital were represented by W. Honnold (for J. P* Morgan and
Co. but also closely linked to the Dunkelsbuhler group), Sabin (for the ^
Guaranty Trust) and W. B. Thompson (for the Newmont Mining Corporation).46
The interests of the State in South Africa were represented on the Board
by the Minister of Finance himself, H.C. Hull, and H. Crawford of the
National Bank of South Africa and an MP. (Prior to the establishment of
ths company, Oppenheimer had obtained approval for the venture from Smuts
^imself who regarded it with "considerable favour'**4' Hull's presence on
Board was also approved by Smuts*)
With this sort of powerful backing Oppenheimer was perhaps justified
in holding the highly ambitious views which he was elaborating even before
the company was formed*
"The first object I have in view is to secure for our company a fair
share in the business offering on the Far East Rand* Once this is
accomplished I shall steadily pursue the course of bringing about an
amalgamation of Consolidated Mines and Rand Selection with our own
company. We have already travelled some considerable distance
towards an amalgamation between Mines and Rand Selections ...it does
not seem too optimistic to think that we shall be able, within a
reasonable time, to bring about a willing combination of the three
Eastern Rand holding companies which would straightaway make us the
most important gold group In Johannesburg* There Is, moreover, no
reason why our new company should not grow in other directions than
in gold development* It may for Instance play a part in the diamond
world* What South Africa wants /for diamond*/ Is enterprise and
money and I believe our new company will supply both*"4B
We shall not follow Oppenheimer through the various deals that enabled him
accomplish these amalgamations leading to Anglo-American becoming the
ominant power In the gold-mining Industry* but shall turn Immediately to
the evolution that occurred within the diamond industry after 1914*
By 1914 South Africa had lost her monopoly position over diamond
production. By the end of World War II, in addition to the increased pro-
duction from South West Africa mines, new mines would have been opened in
Angola, the Belgian Congo, West Africa and Tanganyika* As well as these
mines the diamond market would have to cope with the opening of two new
diamond areas in South Africa itself: in the Lichtenburg district of the
Transvaal and in Namaqualand. The dominant position of De Beers had been
seriously threatened by the beginning of South West African production and
by the opening of the Premier Mine* Attempts made by the dominant oli-
garchy prior to World War I to maintain •normal1 marketing conditions had
met with a number of problems* These centred around the problems of
reconciling the divergent interests of the different producing areas; of
reconciling the interests of the distributors among themselves; and of
reconciling the interests of the producers with those of the distributors*
All these divergent groups had a common interest in preventing the
destruction of the market.
The expansion of production after World War I made these problems
much more acute since more disparate interests were involved and more
finance was required to buy up and, if necessary, hold indefinitely the
quantities produced. A more centralised form of control - the complete
vertical integration of the industry - was necessary to cope with these
problems if the oligarchy was to maintain its dominant position. With
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the dominance of De Beers over the other producers and the establishment
Of the Syndicate as the single most important sales channel, the graund-
work had already been laid* Furthermore, the increasing dominance of
be Beers over the operations of the Syndicate laid the basis for the final
extension of the process of control: the ownership of the seller's
organisation by the producers through De Beers*
This process was continued by the 19X4 Conference of Diamond
Producers (mentioned above) which established the Diamond Producers
Association composed of De Beers, Premier, Jagersfontein and Consolidated
Diamond Mines of South West Africa, and which aimed at 'rationalising1 the
production side of the industry* In 1917 De Beers had managed to purchase
a controlling holding in the Premier Diamond Mines thus extending their
control. But the main pressure for •rational' centralisation was exerted
by Oppenheimer utilising the resources of Anglo-American. By 1921 the
process of consolidation within the Par Bast Rand goldfields was well under
way and Oppenheimer could turn his attention to the diamond industry. In
a letter to his American associates he outlined his intentions*
"Further to this, from the very start, I expressed the hope that
besides gold, we might create, step by step, a leading position in
the diamond world, thus concentrating by degrees in the corporation fs
hands the position which the pioneers of the diamond industry (the
late Rhodes, Wernher, Beit etc.) formerly occupied. Such a position
is most difficult to attain, requiring intimate knowledge of the
diamond trade, pluck and a great deal of patience, but, above all,
Lhe support of powerful financial groups, who would be prepared to
play the part which Messrs* Rothschilds played vis-a-vis the
original leaders, at the time of the De Beers amalgamation. It is
riulte evident to my mind that eventually an amalgamation of the four
big diamond producers (De Beers, Premier, Jagersfontein and
Consolidated Diamonds) will be brought about, and I see no reason,
if we continue our diamond policy, why we should not play a leading
role in such an operation ,'"W>
!:is first move was, with the indispensable aid of his 'overseas'
connections, to acquire control of the diamond mines of South West Africa.
He then b*gan participating in and concluding agreements with 'outside
producers* in Angola, the Congo and West Africa, while all the time
steadily acquiring shares in De Beers Itself. His increasing diamond
acquisitions enabled Anglo-American to gain membership of the Diamond
Syndicate. A disagreement with De Beers led to Oppenheimer founding a
•new1 Syndicate which he could effectively control. In 1925 he bought out
the 'old* Syndicate and thus secured an important coup In the struggle to
gain control over De Beers* His subsequent acquisition of the main claims
in the Lichtenberg and Namaqualand areas increased his power substantially
In 1926 his growing holdings in De Beers itself enabled hiia to gain a v
Directorship and in 1929 his appointment as Chairman indicated that he
had gained control of the company. Power within the financial oligarchy
had over this period been transferred from the Wernher Beit/De Beers group
into the hands of the Dunkelsbuhler/ Oppenheimer group and the ^ake-over
of De Beers by Oppenheimer put the seal on this process. A new era in
the evolution of the diamond industry had begun.
The onset of the Depression intensified the already pressing need
to 'revolutionise' the industry* The producers were forced to cut back
drastically on production (or face disaster) while the Syndicate would
have to carry Immense stocks which could not be disposed of. The existing
loosely-knit structure of the Industry made it impossible to solve these
problems. A new structure had to be created. The Diamond Syndicate was
abolished and, in its place, arose the Diamond Corporation* However, the
crucial difference between this institution and its predecessor was that
the major Interest in the Diamond Corporation was held by the Southern
African producers. Hence, under Oppenheimer• s direction the producers
at last gained control over distribution and could, therefore, direct the
general sales policy of the industry. Nor did the Producers Association
itself escape drastic reorganisation. A new Association was formed which
not only widened its membership to include certain 'outside' producers
but also gave De Beers control over the other producers by equity owner-
ship of the shares*
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Thoeo cha»9*>* were ainwd at neeting for once and for aJ.1 the three
problems that had haunted the diamond industry since its inception. The
problem of the divergent interests of the producers was met by including
as many producers as possible into an Association which was controlled by
De Boers; the problem"of reconciling the interests of the distributors
was met by creating a powerful new channel for sales; the problem of
reconciling the 'contradictory1 interests of the producers and distributors
was finally met by placing control of the Diamond Corporation in the hands
of De Beers. (The Articles of Association of the Diamond Corporation gave
De Beers the right to appoint half the Board including the chairman.) In
addition, the Diamond Corporation entered into purchase agreements with
•outside1 producers, thus meeting the problem of 'outside1 production. The
vertical integration of the diamond industry was complete with the
Oppenheimer group exercising, through De 3eers, near-absolute control over
the industry.50
The tightening up of the links between the De Beers-dominated diamond
iiiJuRtry and the Anglo-American gold-mining interests was speedily carried
out,, In 1936 Oppenheimer announced the formation of the Anglo-American
Iiivr-r.tirisnt Trust which aimed at this end.
"One lesson which the years of depression has taught us is that it
is undesirable for a corporation such as ours to keep a large part
of its investments in an unquoted form. As you are aware, a large
portion of our diamond interests is in this form, but the present
partial recovery of the diamond trade with its promise of a complete
recovery enables us to rectify this position* Arrangements are now
?.;i craxn for the formation of a new company to be called • Anglo
African Investment Trust Ltd,', which company will be managed and
controlled by your corporation, and which will acquire from this
cej.yoration, its allied companies and friends their holdings of
S-VAWG and debentures in diamond companies• The new company's
principal assets will consist of substantial holdings of shares in
D& Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd,, and shares and debentures in the
Diamond Corporation Ltd* The company will have no power to engage
in :rd.ning as that is the business of De Beers Consolidated Mines
and its allied concerns; similarly the company will not deal in
diamonds or precious stones as that is the business of the Diamond
Corporation Ltd* The principal business of the new company will be
to hold investments in diamond companies and by virtue of its large
 5-
holdings it will occupy a commanding position in the diamond trade."
Thus from the legal and administrative point of view De Beers would remain
^a. separata undertaking. However, the creation by Anglo-American of a
'powerful subsidiary (the Anglo American Investment Trust) to act as a
holding company to manage its diamond interests ensured that the diamond
industry as a whole (and De Beers within it) were firmly held in a
structure dominated by the parent concern* As chairman of the Anglo
American Investment Trust Oppenheimer retained his personal interest in
the diamond industry.
Oppenheimer next turned his attention to 'rationalising* the business
operations of De Beers itself* In 1944 he established the De Beers
Industrial Corporation whose aim was "to participate in industrial
development arising from its interests"*5^ In other words, this new
company was established to manage De Beers industrial interests, the most
important of which was, at this time, African Explosives and Chemical
Industries*
Finally, in 1952, utilising some of the huge profits (over £40m)
which had accrued to the Diamond Corporation as a result of the extra-
ordinarily high prices it had received for the sale of the large stock
of diamonds it had bought up at very low prices during the Depression,
Oppenheimer established the De Beers Investment Trust. His intention
in establishing this new company was that it "will be employed in
participating in the mining development of this country, in the same
manner as De Beers Industrial Corporation is taking part in the Union's
industrial expansion11.53 Early investments of the new company included
participation in the gold mines of the Far West Rand and the Orange Free
State.
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Hence, having secured the dominance of De Boors over the whole of
the diamond industry, Oppenheimer fortified his hold over De Beers by
firmly entrenching it within the new Anglo-American group structure • From
his base in South Africafs gold-mining industry, Oppenheimcr thus exer-
cised control over De 3eers and its subsidiaries through the establishment
of the Anglo-American Investment Trust, a subsidiary of Anglo-American
itself. The business activities of De Beers were then further •ration-
alised1 • While its diamond mining operations remained under its direct
control, the De Beers Industrial Corporation was set up to manage its
industrial interests and the De Beers Investment Trust was established
primarily to manage its non-diamond mining interests (particularly gold).
Through this latter company a proportion of De Beers's •diamond1 profits
could be channelled back into the world of gold in which Oppenheimer was
based*
The circle was complete* The fusion of the gold and diamond
industries under the control of a financial oligarchy, dominated by the
Oppenheimer group, had been accomplished.
DUNCAN INNES
September 1974
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public.•..The public bought shares in the diamond mining
companies....not to obtain dividends on their capital
invested, but for purposes of pure speculation",
(J.W.Mathews : Twenty Year's Personal Experience in S.A. -
London,1887).
11* As previously stated, De.Beers had been formed out of a
combination of the successful claims of Rhodes, Rudd,
Maguire and others. Rhodes himself had moved into dealing
as well, where he had attained considerable success, which
in part resulted from the important contacts which he had
with major shareholders in the Chartered Company in London.
Rhodes1 financial wealth coupled with those of his associates
enabled De Beers to buy up the smaller claim-holders in the
'Old Rush' dzy digging mine, so that with the transition to
deep-level mining on the old site, the largest company in the
new De Beers Mine was the De Beers Company. Ihe Kimberley
Central Diamond Mining Company was the largest company in the
new deep-level Kimberley Mine, (the dry digging was known as
the 'New Rush'). The major shareholders in the Kimberley
Company, (which was registered in I860), were the Barnatos,
originally Kimberley diamond dealers who began buying up
claims and then established a London-based firm. They,too,
accumulated great wealth as a result both of their activities
in diamond production and dealing. The French Company,
(Corapagnie Francaise des Mines de Diamant du Cap de Bon
Esperance), arose out of JUles Forges and Company, a Paris
firm of diamond dealers, (merchants). In 1871 Julius
Wernher went to ' . Kimberley as a buyer for this firm, (in
1878 he became a partner in the firm), and in 188? Alfred
Beit became the Kimberley representative of this firm*
As Jules Forges and Company increased their interest in S.A.
they began buying claims until they were owners in some of
the largest companies in the Kimberley mines, (4 out of the
5). They founded the Griqualand West Diamond Mining Company
in the Kimberley Mine which was later reformed and renamed,
The French Company. Hence at this stage the major forces in
the diamond industry were emerging : Rhodes and Rudd associa-
ted with the De Beers Company; the Barnato's associated
with the Kimberley Central Company; and Wernher and Beit
associated with the French Company. (This latter group
also had close contacts with Dunkelsbuhler and Company.
Anton Dunkelsbuhler himself had arrived in Kimberley in 187?
representing the Mosenthals, (diamond dealers). In 1878 he
formed his own firm, Dunkelsbuhler and Company. Dunkelsbuhler
was, through marriage, a cousin of Ernest Oppenheimer).
12. Of the 71 companies in existence at this time, 13 were in
the De Beers Mines, (total capital t £1,334,100); 13 in
the Kimberley Mines, (capital : £2,685,000); 18 in
Dutoitspan Mines, (capital: £2,220,750); 16 in the
Bultfontein Mines ,(capital £871,100); and 11 in 'outside
mines', (capital : £923,00). Total capital : £8,O33»95O.
(S.Frankel t op.cit.).
13. The seriousness of the Depression is partly indicated by
these figures s merchandise imports into the Cape fell from
£9,37',OOO in 188? to under £3,8OO,OOO in 1886; also, the
Notes in Circulation, itotAl Deposits and Total Advances of
the Standard Bank of S.A. , fell from £764,586; £8^>79,287
and £9,676,431, respectively, at 3Oth.June, 1881 to £308,174;
£4,398,083 and £4,53?,473 at 3Oth.June, 1886•
(Amphlett : History of the Standard Bank of S.A.Ltd. , -
London,1914),
14* One of the essential features of amalgamation in mining
consists in enlarging the unit of production by the fusion
of mines and in so arranging the physical apparatus of
mining as to make larger units possible.
15. C.J.Rhodes, quoted in S.Frankel ; op.cit*
16. Ibid.
17* This period saw the 'take-over1 of banking in S.A. by the
Imperial Banks of the British Dominions. Prior to 1861
all banking in S.A. was in the hands of local banks; by
1892 three Imperial Banks - The Standaxi Bank, (7? branches),
The Bank of Africa, (24 branches) and The African Banking
Corporation, (18 branches) - completely controlled the
banking business in the Cape Colony* (There was only one
small local bank, the Stellenbosch Bank, left by this time).
(Ibid).
18. Figures from S.Frankel : op.cit.
19. Immediately prior to consolidation the capital of De Beers
stood at £?,OO9,OOO, while that of the Kimberlcy Central
Company was £1,779,650. De Beers stock at that time was
selling at £50 for each £lO-share, making a total valuation
of £8,898,?50 for the mine. At this market estimate the
.valuation of the '.Cimberley Mine was £8,036,000, making the
total for the two mines £17,934,?5O. (Ibid).
?O. Ibid.
21. Since it had been decided not to increase the capital of
De Beers beyond £3,950,000, the purchases in excess of this
issue were provided for by the issue of debentures. (Fixed-
interest securities issued by limited companies in return
for long-term loans, - debentures are usually dated for
redemption between 1O to 4O years ahead).
22. Vertical integration : The undertaking by a single firm of
successive stages in the process of production and
23--distribution of a particular good* 23A1though vertical
integration had previously existed on a small scale in that
some dealers had shares in producing companies while some
producers wsre also directly involved in marketing their own
output, this was the first time that vertical integration
on a large scale - that is, aimed at re-organizing the
marketing process of the whole industry - was attempted.
?4. This Syndicate included the firm, Dunkelsbuhler and Company,
whose quota at this stage was 1O%. The firm remained a
member of the Syndicate until its dissolution.
(T.Gregory : op.cit.).
25. As a De Beers official wrote at the time s "At last we are
going to have a share in the huge profits which for so many
years have been pouring into the pockets of the Syndicate
to our detriment11. (Quoted in Ibid).
36. For this litter group of mines Rhodes coined the phrase :
"too poor to work, too rich to ignore".
27. Rhodes1 address to shareholders at the 5th.Annual General
Meeting of De Boers. (Quoted in T.Gregory t op.cil.)-
?8. Ibid.
?9. De Beers : Annual General Meeting, : 1893* (Ibid).
30. T.Gregory : op.cit.
31. This was managed through the following channels : Wernher
and Beit, (whose firm, Wernher, Beit and Company, was a
member of the Syndicate and who were also life governors of
De Beers), formed, together with S.Neumann, the London
directorate committee of Rand Mines. However, S.Neumann
also happened to be one of the four London directors of the
Pr eraier Diamond Mining Company. In addition, one of the
other members of the London Committee of directors of
Premier was F.English whose brother, R.English, was a
director of De Beers.
32. The American market at this time took 7OSS of the total
output of the industry. In addition, however, Europe was
seriously affected as well and as a result there was heavy
unemployment in the diamond cutting centres of Amsterdam
and Antwerp. (T.Gregory : op.cit.)
33. The Syndicate already had an accumulated stock of £3 million
worth of diamonds which they couldn't get rid of and were
in addition receiving £643,000 worth of diamonds .per month.
(Ibid).
34. Premier felt that, even with a fall in prices, they could
get a much larger share of the trade by not restricting
output than they would get by accepting the proportion which
De Beers were prepared to offer them.
35* T.Gregory : op.cit*
36. Output rose very quickly - from 560,000 carats in 19O9/1O
; to 1,570,000 carats in 1913/14. (Ibid).
37. Quoted Ibid. Before the conference De Beers sent a
delegation to Luderitzbucht to find out more about "German
S.W.A.annual output and life". One of the members of the
delegation was E.Oppenheimer.
38. The conference itself looked like a preparation for War
with German interests opposed to De Beers, representing
mainly British and French interests. (Sir David Harris
has estimated that in 1914 half the European holdings of
De Beers shares were in French hands). (Ibid).
39. Op.Cit.
40. These were I Beit, Eckstein, R.English, Go1die, Harris,
Hamilton, Jameson, Joel, Maguire, Meyer, Michell, Neumann,
Mosenthal, Phillips, Robinson, Rube, Rudd and Wernher.
41. In 1885 Transvaal gold production was valued at only
£6,000, while Cape Colony diamond production was £2,228,000.
By 1891 these values were £2,924,000 and £3,556,000,
respectively. By 1898 they were £16,241,000 and £4,128,000.
(T.Gregory t op.cit.).
42. J.A.Hobson : The War in South Afica s op.cit.
43. Ibid.
44. Control by the Wenher Beit Group was exercised over Goetz
and Company through Rothschild, (together with Wernher
and Beit he owned the Exploration Company), who had a
controlling interest in the company, and over Albu and
Company, through the Dresdener Bank, ( in which Wernher and
Beit had major holdings), which had major holdings in the
company.
45. One of the reasons why Oppenheimer chose to set up his own
company rather than to work through those already estab-
connections with German capital (Dunkelsbuhlcr himself was German
In 1917 this was not a helpfiul connection.
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 • The financial power of the American companies mentioned here
should not be under-estimated. For instance, in 1901 it was
estimated that J.P. Morgan, as one of the five- big financiers
in the United States, had control of $3,490m (out of a total of
$2,000 controlled by the five). (J.A. Hobaon; The Evolution
of Modern Capitalism: op. cit.)«
47. letter from Oppenhelmer to Honnold. (Quoted In T. Gregory: op.cit
48* Letter from Oppcnheimer to Honnold (25.5.17); Quoted in T.
Gregory: op. cit.
4'». Quoted Ibid.
50. Oppenhe liner fs hand in bringing about thase changes at this time
was considerably strengthened by the fact that the Depression
blocked off the normal channels of finance for his rivals. It
was only his much larger capital resources that enabled him to
supply ths money which was required by the Corporation to buy up
all tha diamonds around during the Depression. Between 1930 and
1931 alone the Corporation bought £13a worth of diamonds* (Ibid).
51* Address to shareholders: Quoted Ibid.
52. Address to shareholders: Quoted Ibid.
53m Address to shareholders: Quoted Ibid.
